By Shlomo Gazit Last week, I considered the review undertook by the BBC in 22 nations, which found that Israel took the third place on the list of the most rejected nations. The first place on that review was taken by Iran. I worry that if the review were held today, after the talks by Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and Iranian leader Rouhani at the UN General Assembly, Iran would misplace its title and Israel would have taken its place in this “esteemed” place. This is certain thing that problems me. Our place in the worldwide public attitude review is just as important and no less of a risk to Israel’s future than the Iranian nuclear task or the Palestinian problem. Since its presidential elections, Iran has tried to present a new approach and a more flexible policy. I realise and accept a careful response, one that adopts the stance of “respect him but suspect him’. although, I have bookings with the position which states in accelerate that Iran has not altered and that the existing regime will not change in the future. The register of evidence brought up by Netanyahu, clues that presents Iran’s devious plots, all mentioned to the period the preceded Iran’s new look. This may assist the purpose of Israel’s public relatives purposes – and I question that – but it points to something much more unsafe: Netanyahu’s Israel is fixated with a “conception” and is resistant to the likelihood of an objective examination so long as this notion is in location. Israel lately marked the 40th celebration of the Yom Kippur conflict. Were it not for a infantry beginning, it is possible that the IDF could have been notified in time and the course of the conflict, and its outcomes, could have been altered. More significantly, if not for a political beginning, it might have been likely to prevent the conflict. After the 1967 Six-Day conflict, the political authority, and the majority of the Israeli community, were fixated with the beginning that the Arab world was very resolute to decimate Israel – despite of what the leaders of the Arab world would say or propose, we would not believe them. On September 1, 1967, the Khartoum summit of Arab state managers after the Six-Day conflict came to a deduction. Israel characterised this summit as the “Three No’s” summit, one where the Arab world declared “no calm, no recognition of Israel, no value with Israel.” Foreign newspapers, on the other hand, enclosed the summit in a completely different kind – “very realistic discussions, a unassuming step towards peace, and Egypt apparently talks about a political solution.” Today, we understand from the numerous publications disclosed at the time that there was a very powerful and realistic basis for the foreign commentary granted then, while there was furthermore a justification for our rough and pessimistic assessment of the summit at the same time. The malfunction we had – from both an understanding and political perspective – was not in the evaluation, but in the unwillingness to analyze and give the affirmative and optimistic evaluation a chance. The Arab world altered its place at the time because of the intense pressure that originated in the awaken of the war. When Rouhani was elected as president by the persons of Iran, it was not out of a reason to deceive Israel and the world – it was an honest sign of the severe anguish prevailing in the homeland. I don’t expect that Israel will do away with its suspicions. I anticipate it to frankly analyze the opposite choice – the likelihood that the very sore sanctions imposed on Iran just might be accomplishing their objective.